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 The Tortoise and the Hare: Economic Growth in 
Britain and the Netherlands c. 1500-1800 
 
 
For much of the seventeenth century the most significant commercial 
and military rivalry in Europe was that between Great Britain and the Dutch 
Republic.  The rivalry resulted in a series of vicious, mainly naval wars 
between 1652 and 1684.  Although in the long run Britain’s beggar-my-
neighbour commercial policies prevailed over the Dutch, for decades 
travellers to Holland and leaders of British public opinion marvelled at 
Dutch ingenuity and success.  A well-informed contemporary noted how the 
Dutch Republic’s ‘prodigious growth in Riches, Beauty, extent of Commerce, 
and number of Inhabitants’ had made it ‘the Envy of Some, the fear of 
others, and the Wonder of all their Neighbours’ (Temple 1673: Preface).  The 
population of Amsterdam surged from 30,000 in 1550 to 175,000 by 1650, 
making it the fourth city in Europe by the latter date (after London, Paris, 
and Naples) (de Vries 1984: 271).   Historians (e.g. Schama 1987; Israel 
1989) celebrate Dutch ‘precocity’ and ‘primacy in world trade’ during the 
Golden Age (c. 1580-1670).  The ability of a small nation − with a population 
of only 1.5 million people in 1600, compared to Britain’s six million and 
France’s 18.5 million − to thrive on such a thin natural resource base was 
the envy of its rivals.   
Dutch supremacy was not to last, however.  By the late eighteenth 
century it was the British economy that attracted the headlines.  Dutch 
retardation was linked to its earlier success, in two senses.  First, Dutch 
  1economic precociousness attracted the attentions of rapacious rent-seeking 
neighbours.  Even the accession of William III to the English throne in 1689 
did not relieve the Dutch of the burdens of the Navigation Acts.  Second, the 
Netherlands’ relative precociousness the seventeenth century gave rise to a 
set of institutions that did not serve it well after 1800 or so (van Zanden and 
van Riel 2004).  This sense that the Netherlands paid a price for being an 
‘early starter’ suggests the case for taking a longer perspective in assessing 
the performance of the early modern Dutch economy, and for treating the 
period 1500-1800 or so as a unit.  Here changes in national incomes in the 
Netherlands and in Great Britain over that period are compared. 
 
 
1. Dutch ‘Modernity’ during the Golden Age 
Three decades ago Jan de Vries described the Netherlands of the 
Golden Age era as a ‘high-level traditionalist’ economy, which by the 
eighteenth century had sunk ‘into a complacent stagnation’.  Others 
support this assessment; van Zanden recently dubbed the growth of the 
Golden Age era ‘pre-modern’ because it failed to generate significant gains in 
living standards and was not sustainable in the long run.  Against this, 
however, the Dutch made pioneering and enduring contributions in the 
realms of agriculture, financial institutions, shipping, social welfare, and 
public finance.  More recently, de Vries and van der Woude have described 
the early modern Dutch economy as the first to experience ‘modern 
economic growth’ (de Vries 1976: 251, 252; Soltow and van Zanden 1998: 
  231; de Vries and van der Woude 1997; McCants 1997; see too Goldstone 
2002).   
Political arithmetician Gregory King’s national accounts imply that in 
the late seventeenth century the Dutch Republic was the richest economy in 
Europe. He reckoned that Dutch income per head exceeded that of England 
by ten to fifteen per cent at the end of the Dutch Golden Age. This gap is 
much less than that allowed by Maddison, who implies that for over three 
centuries the Dutch enjoyed higher GDP per head than anywhere else, and 
that in 1700 Dutch GDP per head was 1.7 times the United Kingdom level 
(de Vries 1974: 242-3 (citing King); Maddison 2000: Table B-21).  
Maddison’s data imply that the Dutch and British economies had roughly 
the same GDP per head c. 1500.  Then the Netherlands forged ahead of its 
great rival, only to lose ground from the late seventeenth-century on, and to 
be overtaken during the Industrial Revolution.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Van Zanden’s reconstructions of Dutch GDP imply a very different 
trajectory before c. 1820.  Whereas Maddison’s numbers imply only a small 
Dutch advantage over the United Kingdom c. 1500, van Zanden’s imply an 
advantage of nearly three-fifths.  And while Maddison reckons that real GDP 
per head in the Netherlands rose by 140 per cent between 1500 and 1820, 
van Zanden’s best guess is that the rise was about one-third that (Maddison 
2001 Table B-21; van Zanden 2001; compare Federico 2002).  The 
contrasting Maddison and van Zanden trajectories are summarized in Table 
  31.  Meanwhile de Vries and van der Woude (1997: 709-710), wisely perhaps, 
refuse to ‘venture an estimate’ of the growth rate of the Dutch economy 
before the 1660s.  Nonetheless they are confident that income per capita 
rose, pointing to significant productivity increases in agriculture, services, 
and shipping, the big rise in energy consumption in the previous two 
centuries or so.  It is enough to point out here that if van Zanden’s estimate 
for 1500 is correct, then the Anglo-Dutch gap would have opened up earlier 
and all that the calculations that follow will be underestimates of the gap. 
In the debate about incomes in the early modern Netherlands and 
Britain, wage data only muddy the waters further.  Recent estimates by  
Allen (2001), shown in Figure 1, suggest that building labourers (BL) and 
building craftsmen (BC) in London (L, representing England) were better 
paid than their counterparts in Amsterdam (A, representing the 
Netherlands) in the first half of the sixteenth century, but that they lost 
their lead thereafter and did not regain it for a century or more.  Allen’s data 
also suggest that real wages in Amsterdam were about one-fifth higher in 
1750-99 than they had been in 1550-49, while in London they were about 
the same in both periods.  Meticulous research by John Munro (2001), on 
which Table 2 below is based, corroborates Allen’s findings for the early 
sixteenth century.  It reveals that wage earners in England c. 1500 had the 
edge over wage earners in the Antwerp region – generally conceded to be at 
least as economically advanced as Holland at this time – but that they lost it 
during the following few decades.  Such data are not so readily squared with 
van Zanden’s claim that Dutch GDP per head was 1.58 times British c. 
1500, nor with the assertion that ‘real wages declined a lot between 1500 
  4and 1800’ (van Zanden 2001; 2002: 154); but they are not so easily 
reconciled either with the almost three-fold rise in GDP per head indicated 
by Maddison over the same period.  Van Zanden concedes that English GDP 
per head in 1650 was unlikely to be ‘only about half the Dutch level’ (2001: 
78-9). 
 
[Figure 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
 
In the present paper, I work with an amended version of Maddison’s 
estimates, which imply that GDP per head in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom were roughly equal c. 1500, and again in the 1840s.  In-
between, the Dutch built up a lead over the British that reached its peak in 
proportional terms in the 1690s; from then on the gap in GDP per head was 
slowly whittled away.  However, since the historiography is really about 
Anglo-Dutch rivalry, I have adjusted Maddison’s GDP per head data to 
exclude Ireland.  The adjustment matters because Irish GDP per head was 
much less than British in this period, and Irish population a significant 
proportion of the United Kingdom total, rising from about one-fifth c. 1500 
to one-third c. 1820 (Ó Gráda 1997).  I assume, rather arbitrarily, that Irish 
GDP per head was one-half that of Britain throughout. Figure 1 plots the 
trends in Dutch, United Kingdom, and British GDP per head between 1500 
and the late 1840s, as inferred from Maddison’s data. 
 
 
  52. The Dutch Tortoise and the English Hare 
For all its earlier successes the Dutch economy was widely deemed a 
failure by the early nineteenth century.  Mokyr in his pioneering 
comparative study of the Low Countries offers an overview of ‘the non-event 
of [Dutch] economic stagnation’ in the early nineteenth century (1976: 84; 
see too Drukker and Tassenaar 1997).  As noted earlier, some historians 
link Dutch ‘failure’ relative to industrialising Britain or, indeed, Belgium to 
its own earlier success. They blame the institutional sclerosis of a high wage 
economy encumbered by a generous social welfare regime, unable to cope 
with competition from poorer latecomers (de Vries 1973; Mokyr 1976; de 
Vries and van der Woude 1997; van Zanden 2002a, 2002b; van Zanden and 
van Riel 2004).  The rather sombre historiography of the post-Golden Age 
economy is supported by Maddison’s national account estimates, which 
have Dutch GDP rising by only seven per cent between 1700 and 1820, 
while Belgium’s doubled and the United Kingdom’s more than trebled.  Over 
the same period, Dutch GDP per head fell. 
By Maddison’s reckoning, the Dutch GDP per head overtook UK GDP 
per head in the mid-1510s and maintained its edge until late 1840s (at D in 
Figure 2).  However, if Ireland is excluded the Dutch advantage vanishes 
sooner, in the mid-1790s (at A in Figure 2).  Still, this means that for almost 
three centuries the Dutch enjoyed higher output per head than the British.  
How much was the extra Dutch output worth?  Between 1514/5 and 
1794/5 the average gap was one-fifth of Dutch GDP per head.  Alternatively, 
adding together the annual gaps between those dates yields a sum 
equivalent to 52 times 1795 GDP per head!2   
  6It would take a long time before faster British growth ‘recouped’ the 
accumulated Dutch advantage.  By 1850 only about 12 per cent of the 
accumulated gap in annual GDPs per head had been ‘recouped’.  Six 
decades or so later, only three-fifths of the gap had been made up.  
In partial mitigation, Britain’s population grew faster than Dutch over 
the period.  In an era when most economies were struggling to keep the 
Malthusian wolf away from the door, assessment of relative economic 
performance should also take account of extensive growth.  Comparing 
growth rates in real GDP rather than GDP per capita weighs intensive and 
extensive growth equally.  In Figure 2, the nl(*) schedule tracks Dutch GNP 
per head, weighted by an index that sets Dutch population relative to 
British in 1500 at unity.  British population-weighted GDP per head 
overtakes Dutch in the late 1760s (at C in Figure 2).  Allowing for differences 
in population growth attenuates the Dutch advantage somewhat, to 39 
times 1795 GDP per head.  When population growth is factored in, the 
British also subsequently ‘recoup’ more quickly, by 1858.3
 
[Table 3 here and Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
3. Allowing for urbanisation. 
The Dutch economy’s precocity was founded on the productivity of its 
agriculture and the strength of its commercial sector and its cities.  
However, as Wrigley et al. (1997: 204) warn, ‘the severity of the urban 
penalty should not be underestimated’.  Figure 3 describes urbanisation 
  7rates (where ‘urban’ includes towns and cities of ten thousand or more) in 
the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France c. 1500-1900.  Dutch 
urbanisation rates, unparalleled in early modern Europe, imposed a toll in 
terms of morbidity and life expectancy.  Although it remains unclear 
whether the nutritional status of urban populations generally was inferior to 
that of their rural cousins, we know for sure that they suffered from 
congestion, poor sanitation, adulterated food, and endemic diseases (Riley 
2001: 161-3).  Urbanites everywhere were also smaller in stature.  Many 
rich citizens, aware of the increased mortality risk, left the cities for their 
rural retreats during the summer.  The poor did not have that choice. 
In 1673 England’s former ambassador at the Hague described the 
Dutch ‘as generally not so long-liv’d as in better Airs; and begin to decay 
early, both men and women, especially in Amsterdam’.  He singled out 
‘Diseases of the Climate [which] all hot and dry Summers bring…that are 
infectious among them, especially into Amsterdam and Leyden’ (Temple 
1673: 161).  Alas, in demographic terms, the pre-1800 Netherlands remains 
somewhat of a statistical dark age.  How Amsterdam achieved its 
remarkable population growth in the century or so after 1580 remains a 
mystery, although the high proportions of widowed household heads in 
Dutch towns and cities and the Dutch obsession with cleanliness in the 
Golden Age era are consistent with the presumption that mortality was high 
in a congested, damp environment (van Strien 1993: 212-3, 231n95; van de 
Woude 1972: 311-13; Schama 1987: 375-84).4  However, hard evidence on 
immigration, on mortality, and the main causes of death are lacking.  Their 
absence has prompted some ‘controlled conjectures’ (de Vries 1985: 664; 
  8van der Woude 1983: 197-209; de Vries and van der Woude 1997; van 
Leeuwen and Oeppen 1997).   
An important contribution by Alter reports life expectancies at birth of 
25.3 years for the lives of nominees in the Amsterdam life annuities of 1586-
90 and 30.0 years for those of 1672-74 (Alter 1983: 33).  The disappearance 
of plague was the main cause of the improvement between the two dates.5  
Plainly, the social rank of the annuitants and their residence in Amsterdam 
are factors: these were prosperous people living in a port city. Although 
some claim that because infectious disease did not discriminate between 
rich and poor, mortality differed less by class in early modern Europe than 
later, 6 evidence cited below suggests that Alter’s estimates should be taken 
very much as an upper bound of life expectancy in the Netherlands at the 
time.  The low life expectancies yielded by the trickle of evidence from local 
studies are corroborative.  Noordam, for instance, reports a strikingly low 
life expectancy of 26.5 years in the Maasland region (south Netherlands) in 
1730-59, while Paping found life expectancies of just over thirty years in five 
Catholic populations living in the northern clay lands around Groningen in 
1731-70 (Noordam 1986; Paping 1988). 
 
 




  9The paucity of Dutch data means that the evidence from urban 
communities in neighbouring countries is also worth considering.  Data 
from England, reported in Table 4 below, imply that the urban penalty in 
terms of life expectancy must have been substantial before 1800 (Woods 
2001; see too Szreter and Mooney 1998).  The shifting rural premium in 
London is of particular interest.  Table 4 implies a huge gap between the 
average life span in London and in England as a whole in the early 
eighteenth century.7  Thereafter the gap dwindled almost without 
interruption (though at an accelerating rate towards the end of the 
nineteenth century).   
Comparing life expectancy of Londoners in general with that of 
London Quakers, a largely middle-class group, implies that social class 
affected mortality too.  The average Quaker might expect to live 28.8 years 
in 1650-99, 24 years in 1700-49, 29.8 years in 1750-99, and 35.5 years in 
1800-49 (Landers 1993: 158).  This implies a gap of 6-7 years between the 
Quakers and the average Londoner in the eighteenth century, although 
London Quakers still died younger than the average rural Englishman and 
Englishwoman.  Perrenoud’s findings for seventeenth-century Geneva reveal 
just as steep a class gradient as in London.  In 1650-84, the life expectancy 
of Genevan workers, male and female together, was 20.5 years; that of the 
middle class was 26.0 years, and that of the elite 36.8 years (cited in de 
Vries 1984: 184; see Perrenoud 1975).8  In the light of such data, Alter’s 
estimates for Amsterdam annuitants’ middle-class nominees must entail 
very short lives indeed for the inhabitants of Amsterdam.  A six-year gap 
between the middle-class and the population as a whole would indicate life 
  10expectancies in the cities of less than twenty years in the 1580s and 23-25 
years in the 1670s.  
Given the high rate of Dutch urbanization at a time when the urban 
mortality disadvantage was very striking indeed9, it is surely not farfetched 
to assume that urbanization reduced the average lifespan in the 
Netherlands by an average of two years below British levels over the longue 
durée analyzed here.   
A widely used measure (Usher 1973; Williamson 1984) of the impact 
of changing life expectancy affects human wellbeing is:  
 
GĈ = GC + (1/β).GL 
 
where GĈ  represents growth rate of Ĉ, the ‘true’ standard of living after 
taking the change in life expectancy into account, GC the growth rate of GDP 
per head, β the elasticity of utility with respect to GDP per head, and GL the 
change in life expectancy.  An even simpler but serviceable way of dealing 
with the issue is that proposed by Lichtenberg (2003).10  He defines expected 
individual lifetime wellbeing (EILW) as YA.eA, where YA is average income and 
eA is expectation of life at birth in Economy A.  Relative EILW at a point in 
time then is measured as:  [YA.eA ]/[ YB.eB ].  This amounts to assuming that 
the marginal utility from additions to Y and e is constant.  In effect 
Lichtenberg’s measure of ‘true’ change implies β = 1, so it yields a lower 
return on improved life expectancy than the Usher-Williamson measure, 
which assumes β < 1. 
  11In Table 5 I report the implications of factoring in the value of life for β 
= 0.45 and β = 1.  Even assuming β = 1 reduces the cumulative gains built 
up between 1515 and 1795 considerably.  When differential population 
growth is also allowed for, assuming β = 0.45 erodes most of the Dutch 





  Economic historians tend to have less time than their colleagues in 
political and military history for past heroics or even for past genius.  They 
are used to their entrepreneurs being replaceable, to social savings being 
‘small’, and to economic growth during the Industrial Revolution being 
‘modest’.  Their answers to ‘how big is big?’ are conditioned by a belief in 
Harberger triangles and a confidence that inputs, both animate and 
inanimate, are highly substitutable.  Against such a historiographic 
tradition, the ‘savings’ or ‘costs’ of the alternative routes described in this 
paper are very significant.  The benefits of Dutch economic precociousness 
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Table 1.  Estimates of Dutch GDP per head, 1500-1820 
Year  [1] Maddison  [2]Van Zanden  [2]/[1] 
c. 1500     761       1,252  1.65 
c. 1650  1,700       2,411  1.42 
c. 1700  2,100       2,386  1.14 
c. 1750  1,985       2,337  1.28 
1820  1,838       1,838  1.00 
Source: Maddison 2001 (for 1500, 1700, and 1820); van Zanden 
2001: Table 4.3; Maddison 2005: 25; my interpolations for 






Table 2. Wages in Southern England and Belgium c. 1500-1540 
Item (Quantity per 
daily wage) 
England 1501-05  Antwerp 1501-05  Ratio (England/Antwerp) 
Wine (litres)    3.47    2.92  1.19 
Herrings (no.)  43.32  48.45  0.89 
Peas (litres)  40.27  19.70  2.05 
Wheat (litres)  22.25  19.84  1.12 
Sugar (kilos)    0.94    1.02  0.92 
    
Item (Quantity per 
daily wage) 
England 1536-40  Antwerp 1536-40  Ratio (England/Antwerp) 
Wine (litres)   2.64   3.49  0.76 
Herrings (no.)  38.17  45.48  0.84 
Peas (litres)  30.50  21.38  1.43 
Wheat (litres)  21.90  17.15  1.28 
Sugar (kilos)    0.39   0.74  0.52 
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       Table 3.  Population and GDP per head in the Netherlands and Great Britain 
  Population (1,000)  GDP per head (1990 international $)
Year      NL      GB        NL       GB   
1500      950    3,142       754       795 
1600   1,500    5,700    1,368     1,060 
1700   1,900    6,640    2,110     1,408 
1820   2,355  14,139    1,821     2,048 






Table 4.  Life expectancy at birth in London and in England & Wales, 1700s-1860s 
Decade  [1] E&W  [2] London  [1]-[2] 
1700s  38.5  18.5    20.0 
1730s  31.8  18.2    13.6 
1740s  33.5  17.6    15.9 
1750s  37.0  20.1    16.9 
1760s  34.6  20.5    13.9 
1770s  36.9  21.6    15.3 
1780s  35.3  25.5      9.8 
1790s  37.1  27.5      9.6 
1800s  37.2  28.0      9.2 
1810s  37.8  32.4      5.4 
1820s  39.6  34.4      5.2 
1830s  40.5  36.9      3.6 
1840s  40.0  36.7      3.3 
1850s  40.0  38.0      2.0 
1860s  40.8  37.7      3.1 
     
Sources:  
London 1730s-1820s: Landers 2000: 171 
London 1700s, 1830s-1860s: Woods 2000: 365 
England & Wales: Wrigley and Schofield 1981: 230. 




Table 5. The Gap in ‘True’ Living Standards (in multiples of 1795 British GDP 
per head) 
  GDP per head  ‘True’ measure 
β = 1 
‘True’ measure 
β = 0.45 
Gap relative to 
1795 GDP per 
head 
52 34 25 
Allowing for 
extensive growth 
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  22ENDNOTES 
 
                                                           
1 I am grateful to Joel Mokyr and Richard Unger for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 Whether discounting is appropriate here is rather a moot point.  Discounting amounts to 
treating all those who lived in the country for part or whole of the period in question as if they 
were represented by a lone individual with no thought for the next generation and with ‘no 
family or friends interested in his (her) survival’ (Williamson 1984: 158).  Yet the historical 
record necessarily involves successive cohorts of individuals, and there is no reason why the 
average individual living in 1620-50 should be valued more than the average individual living in 
1720-50.  A second reason for not discounting is time inconsistency: those same young people 
who tend to heavily discount the future in retrospect regret what seemed like careless over-
spending (van den Berg 2002). 
3 During the eighteenth century the Dutch invested in the British capital market, opening a gap 
between Dutch GDP and GNP.  In relative terms, however, the sums involved were small: in 
the early 1800s foreigners held only 2-3 per cent of British national debt (Neal 1990: 68-72). 
4 De Vries (1995: 669) notes that in the 1730s Amsterdam parish registers recorded an annual 
average of 3,300 girls born; twenty-five years later, an annual average of 1,410 Amsterdam-born 
women were wed.  The ratio seems to imply high mortality, but this makes no allowance for the 
relative importance of inward and outward migration, celibacy, and the likely under-registration 
of births. 
5 These are Alter’s ‘non-select’ estimates, which exclude the first years of each annuity in order to 
minimize selection bias.  In Amsterdam in 1636 the plague killed over seventeen thousand 
people, or one-seventh of the population; in Leiden and in Haarlem too it killed significant 
proportions of the inhabitants. 
6 The estimates of life expectancy yielded by van Leeuwen and Oeppen’s Generalised Inverse 
Projection modeling are generally higher than those derived from annuities between the 1670s 
and 1720s; I do not invoke them here for that reason.   
7 Death-by-age data for London as a whole become available only in the early eighteenth century.    
8 Life expectancy in Geneva grew roughly in tandem with London: from 23.9 years in 1625-49 to 
34.3 years a century later and 39.9 years in 1800-1820 (Perrenoud 1978: 223). 
9 If Dutch patterns were typical, high infant and child mortality would have been responsible for 
most of the urban demographic penalty.  Evaluating the costs using, say, e(15) would reduce the 
cost of urbanisation considerably. 
10 For more recent applied work on this topic compare Nordhaus (2002) and Becker et al. (2003).   
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11 In a rather different vein Robert Lucas has argued, referring to economic growth in the 
developed world in recent decades, that the gap between a growth path associated with ‘real’ 
business cycles one which succeeded in eliminating the cycles was small, in the sense that society 
should have been prepared to pay only a small fraction of output in order to eliminate 
fluctuations (Lucas 2003). 
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